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"In jure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur": Lord Bacon, first "Maxim of the 
Law". 
 
Introduction 
The affirmative duty to disclose medical risks was first imposed upon medical 
practitioners by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
1972 in Canterbury v Spence1 under the doctrine of "informed consent". In 1992, in 
Rogers v Whitaker,2 the High Court of Australia incorporated the new duty, though 
apparently not the doctrine, into the Australian law of negligence. In 1998 the case of 
Chappel v Hart3 provided the High Court with an opportunity to discuss the issue of 
causation in the context of liability for negligent failure to disclose medical risks. 
Issues of breach and causation involving duty to warn were also the subject matter of 
the High Court's decision in Rosenberg v Percival.4 
 
This column will discuss these cases, arguing that the judiciary has effectively created 
a novel legal interest – the invasion of pure autonomy within the context of a 
professional medical relationship. It will also argue that the Donoghue v Stevenson5 
cause of action cannot provide a proper epistemological foundation for protection of 
this new interest. Rather, the liability for invasion of pure autonomy through negligent 
failure to disclose medical risks should form a separate category of case pertaining to 
obligations to advise stemming from a professional relationship. These obligations 
would not be limited to the patient-doctor relationship, but would include all 
relationships that fall within the legal definition of a "professional relationship".6 A 
professional relationship could be generally defined as one in which one party has or 
professes to have some specialist knowledge, training and skills, while the other party 
is especially vulnerable or dependent on the advice of the professional.  
 
It needs to be noted that, apart from professional relationships, there exists an 
obligation to advise in fiduciary relationships and some statutory relationships. In 
Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare,7 the plaintiff, who was at the time 
effectively a ward of State, was dependent on the  
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defendant (in his statutory office as guardian) for information and advice regarding 
the right to recover damages under an accident insurance claim for the loss of four 
fingers of his left hand. Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ stated that the defendant's 
common law positive duty to procure independent legal advice with respect to the 
plaintiff's right to bring an action for damages for personal injury arose independently 
of the fiduciary duty. Their Honours, however, did not explain the basis for the 
affirmative duty at common law.8 Unlike relationships between wards and their 
guardians, clients and lawyers9 or bankers, professional relationships between patients 
and doctors are regarded in Australian law as confidential, but not fiduciary, in 
nature.10 
Critique of the present position regarding duty to warn of medical risks 
The notion of professional advice 
Professional advice, though part of professional practice, can be separated from the 
latter. Typical examples would include the advice of an architect regarding a building 
to be erected by a builder or the advice provided by a solicitor to a client, who agrees 
to the matter being handed over to the barrister. The barrister's advice may or may not 
trigger the process of litigation. Financial advice can be separated from the 
undertaking of investment, and medical advice from treatment or invasive 
examination. In each instance, the separating factor is the conduct of the plaintiff who, 
having received the advice, makes a choice whether or not to act on it.  
 
Yet, in Canterbury v Spence and Rogers v Whitaker, when imposing liability for 
negligent duty to advise of risks inherent in a proposed medical treatment, the judges 
embraced the view that advice constitutes an element of a "single comprehensive duty 
covering all the ways in which a doctor is called upon to exercise his skill and 
judgment".11 This sweeping definition of duty not only is at odds with the classical 
understanding of what constitutes medical treatment, but also confuses legal interests 
involved in the advice and treatment.  
 
Since the advent of Hippocratic medicine, medical treatment has been understood to 
be comprised of three components: diagnosis, prognosis and therapy.12 This 
understanding has been reflected in the tort of negligence, which traditionally 
imposed upon medical practitioners the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
the examination, diagnosis and treatment of the patient.13 Advice about risks that 
would enable patients to decide freely whether or not to consent to invasive 
examination and therapy was, and is, safeguarded by the tort of trespass to the 
person.14 
 
Common law jurisprudence thus distinguishes legal interests protected by trespass to 
the person from legal interests protected by the law of negligence. The right to give or 
to refuse consent, protected by the tort of trespass to the person, involves two legal 
interests – the interest in one's physical integrity as well as the dignitary interest in 
autonomy and personal self-determination.15 Lord Donaldson MR distinguished the 
interests protected by the requirement of consent to treatment from interests involved 
in the right to competent therapy, when he stated that "consent by itself creates no 
obligation to treat".16 Rather, consent operates like a "legal 'flak jacket' which protects 
the doctor from claims by the litigious".17 In other words, consent is preliminary to 
and separate from examination and treatment, the standards of which are governed by  
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the law of negligence. This substantive distinction between rights and interests 
protected by the tort of trespass to the person on the one hand, and negligence on the 
other, was blurred when the courts imposed upon medical practitioners an affirmative 
duty to disclose risks inherent in the proposed treatment.  
 
Thus in Rogers v Whitaker18 a medical practitioner failed to advise his patient about 
remote but serious risks inherent in an eye operation. The operation was performed 
with the required skill, but the patient was rendered blind. Likewise, according to the 
majority in Chappel v Hart, the surgeon, having advised the patient about the more 
common complications that were inherent in the proposed procedure, failed to inform 
her about the risk of further complications that had the potential randomly to follow. 
Again, a sequence of complications, which until then were considered possible but 
unlikely, resulted in a paralysis of a laryngeal nerve. In Rosenberg v Percival, the 
defendant surgeon, Mr Rosenberg, relying on a pre-operative radiological 
examination and a radiology report, which stated that the patient's temporomandibular 
joints were normal,19 did not discuss with her possible adverse consequences of the 
sagittal split osteotomy on these joints.20 The temporo-mandibular joints disorder 
"triggered off" by the surgery was painful and debilitating.  
 
In all three cases, the respective trial judges found that adverse consequences had 
occurred despite the surgery having been performed with competence and skill.21 
Consequently, the question of liability turned on whether the defendant surgeons 
breached their duty to disclose inherent risks of the proposed procedure.22 The 
judiciary stated that the imposition of such duty would enable patients to exercise 
their right of choice whether or not to consent to the proposed treatment.23 For 
example, according to Kirby J in Rosenberg v Percival:  
Fundamental to the formulation [of duty to warn of inherent risks] adopted by 
this Court in Rogers is a recognition, expressed much earlier in the United 
States cases, that a patient "has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body".24 
However, it is difficult to make jurisprudential sense of the explanations why the legal 
interest in the right to choose or decline medical treatment should be safeguarded 
through the general law of negligence under the Donoghue v Stevenson25 cause of 
action (which the author calls "negligence simplex"), in the form of an affirmative 
duty to disclose.  
To deal with this problem, the court in Canterbury v Spence26 developed the doctrine 
of "informed consent" to justify the imposition of an affirmative duty to disclose 
medical risks on the grounds that the "patient's right to self-decision shapes the 
boundaries of the duty to reveal".27 Therefore, the patient's interest in bodily integrity 
commands "protection, not only against an intentional invasion by an unauthorised 
operation but also against a negligent invasion by his physician's dereliction of duty to 
adequately disclose".28  
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The reasoning is muddled for, strictly speaking, "negligent invasion", just like any 
other "invasion", should sound in trespass to the person rather than negligence. 
Indeed, in Rogers v Whitaker, the High Court followed the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Reibl v Hughes29 and the House of Lords in Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal 
Hospital,30 when it rejected the doctrine of informed consent in the context of the law 
of negligence. The court described the phrase "informed consent" as "somewhat 
amorphous", and "apt to mislead as it suggests a test of the validity of a patient's 
consent".31 It also noted that the expression "the patient's right to self-determination" 
is:  
perhaps, suitable to cases where the issue is whether a person has agreed to the 
general surgical procedure or treatment, but is of little assistance in the 
balancing process that is involved in the determination of whether there has 
been a breach of the duty of disclosure.32 
Instead, the High Court explicitly adopted the approach of King CJ who, in F v R,33 
discussed the issue of the imposition of the new duty of disclosure in terms of two 
conflicting values – the duty of doctors to act in what they conceive to be the best 
interests of the patient, and the right of the patient "to control his own life and to have 
the information necessary to do so".34 King CJ determined that the second right 
should prevail. The High Court justified the imposition of an affirmative duty to 
disclose on the grounds that "except in cases of emergency or necessity, all medical 
treatment is preceded by the patient's choice to undergo it",35 and that the "choice is, 
in reality, meaningless unless it is made on the basis of relevant information and 
advice".36 
These statements imply that the tort of trespass protects patients' freedom of choice 
through the right to decide whether or not to consent to an interference, whereas the 
tort of negligence protects patients' right to be informed about the factors which will 
be material to that decision.  
 
In principle, there is no jurisprudential barrier to two different torts safeguarding the 
same legal interest.37 However, the interest in freedom from invasion of pure personal 
autonomy has been outside of the purview of negligence, which – as a matter of 
principle – has protected only interests in actual physical, proprietary and 
psychological integrity (freedom from negligently inflicted psychiatric injury). 
Moreover, the damage occasioned by the defendant's wrongful conduct in cases of 
negligent failure to advise about risks is not of the kind usually protected by 
negligence simplex.  
Consequential damage 
Apart from special duty situations, which nowadays tend to form distinct categories of 
case,38 to be compensable in negligence simplex the plaintiff's damage must be of a 
primary kind – it must arise as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct rather than 
being mediated through an independent agency. Conceptually, damage claimed in 
negligent failure to disclose medical risks is not primary but consequential, in the 
sense of being "one step removed" from the alleged wrongful conduct.39 In San 
Sebastian v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
1979,40 the High Court noted that in negligent representation cases:  
damage flows, not immediately from the defendant's act in making a statement but 
from  
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the plaintiff's reliance on the statement and his action or inaction which produces 
consequential loss.41 
When plaintiffs allege that the medical practitioner failed to disclose a particular risk 
inherent in a proposed procedure, their primary damage is in the form of a 
"meaningless decision",42 but the tort of negligence does not provide remedies for this 
kind of dignitary harm. The physical harm that they suffer is an unintended 
consequence of a skilfully performed procedure. In other words, the actionable 
damage flows from a non-negligent act. However, by a fiat of jurisprudential magic, 
the courts have conflated the two kinds of harm, attributing the physical harm to the 
inadequate disclosure. By rejecting the informed consent doctrine as the foundation of 
the medical duty to disclose, on the one hand, and by failing to provide an alternative 
legal principle for the imposition of this novel duty, on the other, the High Court has 
created an epistemological conundrum.  
 
The concept of negligent representation or non-disclosure occasioning consequential 
damage was first canvassed as a separate category of case by the House of Lords in 
Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners.43 Duties, including the duty to disclose, that are 
additional or "special" to the tort of negligence simplex were imposed on the basis of 
the particular nature of the relationship between the parties.44 To attract the 
affirmative duty to disclose, the representee had to show that in seeking the 
information upon a serious matter from the representor, the representor was trusted to 
exercise due care, and that he or she knew or ought to have known that reliance was 
being placed on competent exercise of skill and judgment.45 A professional 
relationships between doctor and patient46 would fall within the above definition, and 
thus give rise to an affirmative duty to provide adequate and careful information about 
medical risks. Damage in the form of negligent or reckless infringement of the right to 
adequate advice would probably make the new cause of action more akin to trespass 
than negligence, but this would be to the advantage of the plaintiff.  
 
The Hedley Byrne case could have provided a foundation for an obligation to disclose 
risks inherent in a proposed course of action in the context of professional 
relationships. However, as is the wont of the common law, it so happened that, in that 
case, the plaintiff claimed damages for both negligent advice and pure economic 
loss.47 This meant that the court had to consider the inherent potential of words 
uttered negligently to cause financial damage that was difficult to foresee with any 
degree of precision. Their Lordships proceeded on the assumption that a claim for 
pure economic loss was not very different from one for consequential physical 
damage. The substantive difference lay in the source of this loss, namely, negligent 
representation or non-disclosure rather than physical conduct. The emphasis on the 
negligent acts and words as the source of liability is in harmony with the principle that 
the major concern of the law of torts is wrongful conduct rather than the nature of the 
damage resulting from it. Nevertheless, the convergence of negligent advice with pure 
economic loss in Hedley Byrne, and in subsequent cases, has created the perception 
that this category of case has two features: negligent representation and pure 
economic loss, with the emphasis on the latter.  
 
Yet, if we were to refocus on the issue of conduct rather than damage, there is no 
jurisprudential barrier to providing compensation to plaintiffs whose right to make 
autonomous choices is impaired as a result of negligent professional advice. The 
question that will have to be resolved is  
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the valuation of this kind of negligent denial of the right to autonomy.  
Causation 
As noted above, in Rogers v Whitaker the High Court stated that medical practitioners 
are under a "single comprehensive duty covering all the ways in which a doctor is 
called upon to exercise his skill and judgment".48 The phrase "covering all ways" 
allows the court to exercise unbridled discretion when deciding on the required 
normative standard of care pertaining to the doctor's "exercise of skill and 
judgment".49 
 
More importantly, no matter how laudable the rhetoric that underlies the Rogers v 
Whitaker duty to warn, it cannot overcome problems of causation, which, at least 
initially, is a question of fact. Thus, according to Gummow J in Rosenberg v Percival:  
[T]here must be a causal connection, in the legal sense, between the failure to 
warn of the material risk and the occurrence of the injury. Cases involving a 
failure to warn of a risk encounter difficulties of causation that do not arise in 
cases of, for example, a negligent physical act "causing" injury. The failure to 
warn the patient of the risk can never amount in the same sense to the cause of 
the injury. Moreover, the issue of failure to warn usually arises when the 
performance of the physical cause of the injury was not negligent.50 
 
While pinpointing the problem, neither his Honour nor the rest of the court in 
Rosenberg provided a satisfactory solution to it. Mesmerised by the notion of a 
"single comprehensive duty", the court has failed to analyse what would happen in 
cases where the damage is the same, but the advice is split from the performance of 
the procedure. In other words, what if Mrs Whitaker, Mrs Hart or Dr Percival 
received the inadequate advice from respectively Mr Rogers, Mr Chappel or Mr 
Rosenberg, but the respective procedures were competently performed by different 
surgeons, though with the same adverse sequelae?  
 
Had this question been asked, the court would have had to acknowledge that the 
foreseeable risk created by the defendant's wrongful non-disclosure is different from 
foreseeable risks created by careless or incompetent performance of the treatment. 
Assuming that a correct diagnosis has been made, if a doctor then negligently fails to 
disclose a serious risk inherent in the treatment, but the patient, for reasons of her 
own, does not go ahead with the treatment, the negligent conduct will not be 
actionable. This is because the risk of non-disclosure merely relates to the denial of 
the plaintiff's right to make "meaningful choices" regarding treatment options. As 
much was acknowledged by Gummow J in Rosenberg v Percival who, while 
discussing the nature and "materiality of risk" that needs to be disclosed under the 
Rogers v Whitaker duty, stated:  
Where the action is brought in negligence and the plaintiff is seeking 
compensation for an injury suffered, the relevant risk is the possibility that the 
proposed treatment will result in the injury that in fact occurred. It is not, for 
example, the risk that the patient will make an uninformed decision or choose 
the wrong option, although that may well underpin the rationale behind the 
duty.51 
Epistemological perplexities inherent in this approach can be illustrated through a 
non-medical example. A skier intending to ski on the slopes of Porter Heights in New 
Zealand rings the Bureau of Meteorology, informs the meteorologist on duty of his 
intentions, and asks how safe it is to ski in the particular area. He is told that 
conditions are clear, and that there have been no recorded avalanches in this area. An 
unexpected avalanche develops and injures the skier. Should the meteorologist be 
liable for failure to warn about the possibility of the risk of an avalanche occurring? If 
so, can the  
(2001) 8 JLM 358 at 364 
meteorologist successfully plead vis major? But then, what is the conceptual 
difference between known but unexpected and unpredictable events happening in the 
mountains and equally unpredictable reactions of the human body? Does the 
difference lie in the myth that, just as we know how the computer works and thus 
have mastery over it, we know or ought to know and master how the human 
"mechanism" works, a claim we do not make for nature at large.  
 
Having to focus on the ultimate physical damage in medical negligence cases means 
that the concept of fault is stretched to cover not only negligent words but also 
blameless physical conduct. Consequently, the judiciary has created a legal oddity 
whereby surgeons who both advise and operate on a patient can be held liable. 
However, a patient who, as a result of inadequate advice by one surgeon, had agreed 
to undergo an operation by another, and suffered an adverse outcome from a 
competently performed procedure would be unable to successfully sue the performing 
surgeon in negligence. At the same time, it would be difficult to prove that the 
advising surgeon's failure to warn of an unlikely but possible risk had caused the 
patient's actual physical injury.  
 
A discrete remedy for failure to advise of risks may also alleviate other substantive 
problems of causation, which remained unresolved in Chappel v Hart52 and were only 
partially tackled in Rosenberg v Percival.53 According to the High Court, the function 
of causation in negligence is to attribute the fault or legal responsibility to the 
"identified negligent act or omission of the defendant" on the basis that it "was so 
connected with the plaintiff's loss or injury that, as a matter of ordinary common sense 
and experience, it should be regarded as a cause of it".54 The requisite connection will 
be established if the negligent conduct caused or materially contributed to the injury.55 
As pointed out above, in Chappel v Hart the majority regarded the surgeon's fault in 
the form of failure to advise about the risk as having caused or materially contributed 
to the plaintiff's injury in the form of laryngeal paralysis. Far from applying common 
sense and experience, it takes a leap of logic as well as imagination to accept this 
conclusion.  
 
In Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare,56 the joint judgment left unanswered the 
question whether "a failure to take steps which would bring about a material reduction 
of the risk amounts to a material contribution to the injury". In Chappel v Hart, the 
majority asked whether the failure to advise of risks amounted to a material 
contribution to the injury, which is different from the Bennett question, namely, 
whether advising Mrs Hart about the risk to her laryngeal nerve would have brought 
about a material reduction of that risk.  
 
If the question were cast in this way in Chappel v Hart, one would have had to 
consider the fact that, unlike Mrs Whitaker whose eye operation was essentially 
cosmetic, Mrs Hart would have had to undergo the procedure sooner rather than later 
even if there was no failure to inform her that the operation involved an inherent risk 
of mediastinitis injury to the laryngeal nerve.  
 
The question arises why, given the randomness in the incidence of oesophageal 
perforations together with the constant presence of bacteria in the gastric system, but 
its random spread into the oesophagus,57 the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk should 
have brought a material reduction of the risk created by the convergence of these 
factors. The prediction that the risk would not have eventuated if there were a 
postponement of the operation is speculative,58 yet this determination was pivotal to 
the outcome of the case. If the law is to be credible, the discourse about the breach of 
duty to advise about risks should be distinguished from the discourse about the causes 
of a plaintiff's physical injury. As Hayne J in his dissenting judgment in Chappel 
pointed out:  
 
The difficulty in the analysis that looks only to whether the subject matter of the 
negligent  
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conduct (failure to warn of risk to voice) and the damage suffered (damage to the 
voice) are the same is that it does not pay sufficient heed to the comparison that the 
law requires between the facts of what happened and the hypothetical facts of what 
would have happened if there had been no negligent act or omission.59 
 
In a cause of action for failure to advise of risks inherent in the proposed course of 
action causation would not be in issue, for there would be a presumption that, unless 
disproved, the defendant's fault resulted in the denial of the plaintiff's right to an 
informed decision-making.60 This being an actionable damage, the question whether 
its value should sound in nominal or substantive damages would be determined by 
reference to policy considerations.  
Hindsight bias 
In Australia, in cases where failure to warn is in issue, causation has to be established 
by the subjective test of whether the particular patient-plaintiff's state of mind was 
such that, if told of the risk, he or she would have refused to undergo the procedure.61 
Naturally, such plaintiffs argue that, had they known about the risk of the post-
operative complications they suffered, they would never have agreed to the procedure. 
Gleeson CJ in Rosenberg v Percival had thus identified the evidentiary problem raised 
by the subjective test of causation:  
In the way in which litigation proceeds, the conduct of the parties is seen 
through the prism of hindsight. A foreseeable risk has eventuated, and harm 
has resulted. The particular risk becomes the focus of attention. But at the time 
of the allegedly tortious conduct, there may have been no reason to single it 
out from a number of adverse contingencies, or to attach to it the significance 
it later assumed. Recent judgments in this Court have drawn attention to the 
danger of a failure, after the event, to take account of the context, before or at 
the time of the event, in which a contingency was to be evaluated.62 
 
The issue of "hindsight bias" was addressed by each of the judges in Rosenberg v 
Percival.63 Hindsight bias refers to a psychological phenomenon whereby people, 
while retrospectively considering the occurrence of a past event, "tend to exaggerate 
the extent to which it could have been correctly predicted beforehand".64 In hindsight, 
once the undisclosed risk has materialised, medical practitioners appear negligent, 
even if in foresight that would not have been the case, and likewise the plaintiffs – 
having experienced the adverse outcome – are predisposed to believe that they would 
not have agreed to the procedure.65 Factoring in the hindsight bias is particularly 
important where liability is determined on the basis of what was said rather than what 
was done. For when people examine past decisions they are inclined "to highlight data 
that were consistent with the final outcome and de-emphasise data that were 
contradictory or ambiguous".66 
 
In Rosenberg, the hindsight bias was discussed solely in relation to the plaintiffs' 
credibility as  
(2001) 8 JLM 358 at 366 
witnesses when they assert that, if warned of the risk, they would not have proceeded 
with the surgery. While upholding the discretion of the trial judge to believe or 
disbelieve the plaintiff's claim, the court67 suggested a number of objective factors 
that have a role in the assessment of the plaintiff's state of mind at the time of electing 
whether to have the procedure. In determining the issue of credibility,68 the trial judge 
would be expected to consider the plaintiff's personality and demeanour; the need for 
the procedure as established by the medical history and medical opinion; the nature of 
the risk inherent in the procedure and its likelihood of materialising; the plaintiff's 
professional background; his or her knowledge of treatment options; the level of 
questioning or failure to ask about the specific risk; and willingness to undergo the 
general risks of the procedure (for example, a general anaesthetic). These detailed 
guidelines go some way towards reducing the hindsight bias; however, separating 
consequential physical or economic outcome from the breach of duty to advise, would 
minimise the bias even further.  
Conclusion 
Writing in defence of the Rogers v Whitaker doctrine, Kirby J in Rosenberg stated:  
Fundamentally, the rule is a recognition of individual autonomy that is to be 
viewed in the wider context of an emerging appreciation of basic human rights 
and human dignity. There is no reason to diminish the law's insistence, to the 
greatest extent possible, upon prior, informed agreement to invasive treatment, 
save for that which is required in an emergency or otherwise out of 
necessity.69 
The problem is that the negligence action created to protect the rights articulated by 
Kirby J is fundamentally flawed. Locating liability for negligent medical advice in the 
category of case for breach of professional obligation to disclose risks would have 
two jurisprudential advantages. First, the concept of duty to disclose based on respect 
of individual autonomy fits in logically with the notion of careful representation in 
circumstances where there exists a professional undertaking to inform on the part of 
the defendant, and a reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff that the 
information will be correct and comprehensive. Secondly, such a remedy would 
provide a clear conceptual nexus between the claimant's right to disclosure of the risk 
and the infringement of that right through non-disclosure or inadequate disclosure.  
 
One of the virtues of the common law system is its ability to modify flawed or 
iniquitous doctrines.70 Historically, the High Court of Australia has been willing to 
incorporate existing causes of action into other torts, thus altering the elements of the 
former remedy. For example, in 1994, the strict liability of an occupier of land in 
respect of injury caused by the escape of a dangerous substance involved in the non-
natural use of land under the tort of Rylands v Fletcher was incorporated into the 
dominion of "ordinary negligence",71 or, in particular circumstances, into nuisance 
and trespass.72 Likewise, the general action on the case against government officials, 
which provided a remedy for plaintiffs who could prove that they suffered damage as 
an inevitable consequence of the unlawful, intentional and positive acts of 
government officials,73 was absorbed into the law of negligence.74 More recently,75 
the High Court established a new duty of care, when it held that the rule in Cavalier v 
Pope,76 under which landlords were not liable for injuries  
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that arose from the defective state of land or premises let in a dangerous or dilapidated 
condition,77 should no longer be followed in Australia.78 
 
When determining the jurisprudential question of whether a particular cause of action 
should be followed in its extant form, the High Court of Australia tends to consider 
not only the status of authorities that support it,79 but also whether the specific 
requirements of the action are in harmony with general principles that underpin the 
law of tortious liability.80 As has been explained above, at present it is difficult to 
reconcile the liability for medical failure to disclose with principles of duty, breach 
and causation under the Donoghue v Stevenson cause of action.  
 
Discussing jurisprudential foundations for judicially formulated principles in civil 
cases, Dworkin, in his seminal book Taking Rights Seriously,81 distinguished 
principles, which are propositions that describe rights, from policies, which are 
propositions that describe goals.82 According to Dworkin, in the context of legal 
standards that guide the judicial decision-making process, policies set out collective 
community goals such as the advancement or protection of political aims, economic 
efficiency or social welfare.83 Principles are to be observed because they embody the 
requirements of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality which 
respects or secures some individual or group right. Dworkin contended that, in civil 
cases, judicial determinations characteristically are, and should be, generated by 
principle not policy; and that adjudication of what legal rights people have should be 
made in the light of an overall political theory which recognises moral-political 
background rights (rights that provide a justification for a political decision by the 
society) as well as those concrete rights against fellow citizens already demarcated by 
enactments.84 A professional obligation to disclose risks inherent in the proposed 
course of action would sit well with the notion that in modern Australian society, the 
law should recognise the legal interest in the right to adequate information for those 
who seek professional advice. At the same time, the law should also protect those who 
provide the information from being held liable for pure coincidences.  
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